The divestiture remedy under merger control in the EU, US and China: a comparative law and economics analysis
Promovendus: Mw. M. Shi
Promotores: Prof.Dr. M.G. Faure, Dr. N.J. Philipsen
Duur: 1/9/2013 - 31/8/2017
Merger control is commonly one of the important parts in competition laws to protect competition in the market and enhance consumer welfare. In order to better realize the goals of merger control, merger remedy is introduced. It can be seen as an intermediate mechanism which revises the dualistic-patten of the result for merger control- black or white - yes or no. It takes into account the concerns for both the positive result and negative risk brought by mergers and try to reach a balance. Divestiture, as known as one of the most typical structural remedies under merger control, has been adopted by both the EU and US to fulfill the goals of merger control as well as clear the competition concerns. In recent years, divestiture has also been introduced to one of the emerging economies: China. This proposed research intends to evaluate the divestiture remedy from the perspective of the effectiveness and efficiency and try to provide some practical suggestions for China for its improvement. In that respect, it will investigate divestiture from three aspects: what are the main differences among the EU, US and China on divestiture remedy; how to construct the divestiture system with effectiveness and efficiency; whats the economic concerns behind divestiture. The methodology applied will be both comparative legal research (US, EU and China) and Law and Economics.