Judges & Mass Litigation - a Law & Economics Perspective
PhD student: Dr A. Biard
Promotors: Prof M.G. Faure, Prof L.T. Visscher
Duration: 1/10/2011 - 31/8/2014
PhD defence: Rotterdam, 15/12/2014
A few decades ago, CAPPELLETTI observed that the rise of big businesses as by-product of everincreasing consumption and production would sooner or later require the implementation of big judiciaries. In the spring 2011, the replies received by the European Commission to its public consultation on collective redress highlighted stakeholders strong interest in seeing judiciaries play a prominent and leading role concerning the monitoring of procedures enabling group of plaintiffs to seek compensation when large-scale damage occurs. The views that policy-makers have about the work of their judges seems however biased by a Herculean Judge syndrome: judges are expected to be neutral agents, robust while performing under a considerable burden and assuming heavy responsibilities. Alternatively, insights from Law & Economics and Behavioural Law & Economics have shed alternative lights on the contingencies and vagaries of judicial behavior and decision making that policy-makers should nowadays not neglect. On a broader level, the research will also introduce readers to the economic analysis of judicial behavioural and discuss its relevance when applied to civil law judges.