The political accountability of independent agencies in the European Union and the United States
Promovendus: Mw. Dr. M.O. Scholten
Promotores: Prof.Mr. L.F.M. Verhey, Dr. Ph. Kiiver
Duur: 1/9/2008 - 31/8/2012
Promotie: Maastricht, 3/4/2014
In order to lessen the workload of governmental departments and due to the main advantage of their specific expertise independent agencies are an integral part of current governing machinery. They assist in informing, monitoring, preparing, and executing rules and regulations in society. Their forms as well as their functions vary greatly from state to state as well as from specific areas where they might operate. Yet some of them are delegated with decision- or law-making powers. Based on the comparative research of several states(jurisdictions are to be selected) and the European Parliament, the research will focus on the following questions: How come that such non-elected independent agencies created by governing authorities enjoy law-making powers? How do they fit into the constitutional separation of powers? Having legislative powers how do they get along with national legislative organs, namely parliaments? And how do national parliaments make them accountable if they are independent?