Promovendus: Mw. F. Leucci

Promotor: Prof.Dr. M.G. Faure

Duur: 1/11/2018 - 31/10/2022

Promotie: Rotterdam, 19/6/2024

Abstract:

From a perspective of Law and Economics one of the main goals of liability would be to minimise the costs of accidents through the provision of incentives for optimal levels of care and activity to potential tortfeasors. However, the underlying question of this research is whether liability might still provide these incentives when harm is caused to the environment and accident costs are more difficult to estimate. Indeed, scholars of law and economics have not yet fully unveiled the relationship between damage assessment and liability with respect to the environment. After setting out the economic theory of environmental liability and optimal remedies, this research investigates the incentive effects of liability laws in the E.U. by means of a comparative law and economic approach. Consequently, attention will be paid to the judicial reasoning in practical cases at the international, supranational and national level. We expect to find that the current assessment of environmental damages hinders the efficiency of liability in preventing environmental harm because damages are undervalued. Eventually, policy implications involving different methodologies of damage assessment (e.g., Payments for Ecosystem Services) will be analysed.